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REPORTING FROM THE FRONT LINE-
ONE MEDIATOR'S EXPERIENCE
WITH MASS TORTS
Kenneth R. Feinberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past fifteen years, I have been involved in various ca-
pacities in some of the most visible, provocative, and challenging
mass tort litigation in the nation. Beginning with the Agent Orange
products liability litigation,1 I have served, in one capacity or another,
in attempting to resolve and then implement settlements in cases in-
volving Dalkon Shield,2 asbestos, 3 DES,4 Shiley heart valves,5 and sili-
cone breast implants.6 More recently, I have been retained to pro-
vide some creative input into some type of global resolution of the
nation's tobacco controversy.7 And, in attempting to provide a
* B.A., University of Massachusetts, 1967; J.D., New York University
School of Law, 1970. Mr. Feinberg is a nationally recognized expert in alterna-
tive dispute resolution. In addition to establishing a law firm in Washington
D.C., which specializes in mediation, he has served on two Presidential Commis-
sions inquiring into the implications of radiation exposure to American citizens.
See Exec. Order No. 12658, 3 C.F.R. 614 (1988) (establishing the Commission on
Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents), amended by Exec. Order No. 12665, 3 C.F.R.
320 (1989), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12774, 3 C.F.R. 348 (1991), reprinted in
42 U.S.C.A. § 2210 (1997); Exec. Order No. 12891,3 C.F.R. 847 (1994), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210 (establishing the Committee on Human Radiation Ex-
periments).
1. See Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.),
611 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 818 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987).
Z See In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1989).
3. See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735 (E. &
S.D.N.Y 1990).
4. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
5. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
6. See Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig.) No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 114580 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1,
1994).
7. See Richard B. Schmitt, Tobacco-Suit Settlements Are Seen Becoming
Tougher, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1997, at B9; see also Richard B. Schmitt, To-
bacco-Suit Pacts May Become Tougher, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1997, at B8 (W.
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comprehensive list, I should note my role in two private national set-
tlements involving thousands of property damage claims pertaining
to allegedly defective polybutylene pipe," and certain types of plastic
pipe attached to home furnaces.9
All of these cases have afforded me an opportunity to deal with
the challenges associated with comprehensive resolution. Whether
wearing the hat of a court-appointed Special Master, Referee, Trus-
tee, or simply that of a private mediator retained by the parties to the
dispute, the various litigations have posed interesting and unique in-
tellectual and practical challenges to the litigants, the courts, and the
public. Although each case has posed different obstacles, one over-
riding issue pervades all of them-how can our civil justice system
provide efficient and effective relief in cases involving thousands-or
even millions-of claims? A second related issue' is even more
acute-how does one go about resolving the inherent, inevitable ten-
sion between mass tort claims and the basic principle of individual
justice? Are the two compatible? Can efficiency of resolution and
justice tailored to the individual claimant stand side-by-side? Or
does one inevitably succumb to the pressures of the other?
In reporting on my experiences and highlighting some of the re-
curring challenges that pose obstacles to mass tort resolution, I
should make one additional point at the outset. Although my role in
mass tort litigation often includes the function of mediator-that is,
assisting the parties in attempting to facilitate a settlement of the dis-
pute-this highly visible role has proven to be the easiest part of the
job. Helping very sophisticated judges and lawyers achieve a consen-
sual settlement of a mass tort is the easy part; the real challenge is
developing and implementing creative mechanisms designed to bring
justice to the litigants. For example, in most mass tort litigations, a
series of intensely heated negotiations among adversaries usually re-
sults in a comprehensive settlement for a fixed amount of settlement
dollars. The resolution of the controversy is announced with great
fanfare, and I am asked to explain how the negotiations resulted in
success. The fact is, however, that achieving global resolution almost
inevitably requires the development of unique terms and conditions
concerning such variables as: claimant eligibility criteria; the treat-
ment of future as well as present claims in cases involving latent
Coast Ed.).
8. See Cox v. Shell Oil Co., No. 18844, 1995 WL 775363 (Tenn. Ch. Nov. 17,
1995) (final order approving the class action settlement).
9. See J. Wheeler, The Inescapable Lesson of the Plastic Vent-Pipe Ban,
SUPPLY HoUSE TIMEs, Nov. 1994, at 43.
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disease; thorny issues of scientific and medical causation; complex
debate over the distribution of settlement proceeds-lump-sum ver-
sus installment payments; and the development of administrative
procedures in the event that an individual claimant is unhappy with
the amount allotted. These issues are rarely publicized, but their
resolution often determines success or failure.
To label my work "mediation" is, therefore, a misnomer. That
part of my assignment would be better titled "creative problem
solver." The development of solutions to the difficult problems
which arise in the context of a mass tort settlement is what most tests
the mettle of the courts, the lawyers, and the public. This challenge is
the most exciting and difficult.
The following is an informal summary of my work and a discus-
sion of the most difficult issues which arise in the course of my role as
mediator and problem solver. It is neither an exclusive list, nor is it
offered in careful detail with all ramifications considered. Instead, I
have tried to provide a detailed blueprint, developed over the past
fifteen years, which helps elucidate the obstacles to success which
tend to repeat themselves despite the differences in the litigation and
the obvious variations in allegedly harmful products, culpability, and
nature of the tort claims.
Finally, it may prove useful to divide my work in the world of
mass torts into two phases. Phase I begins with my role in the Agent
Orange case and continues through the settlement of the heart valve
class action. This can be viewed, in one important respect, as the
high-water mark of the effective use of Rule 23 in securing compre-
hensive mass tort settlements.'0 Phase II includes my work in breast
implants, tobacco, and the private pipe mediations. Phase II has
proven to be a period of retrenchment when it comes to the global
resolution of mass tort litigation. It culminates, of course, in last
term's Supreme Court decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Wind-
sor,1 and Metro North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley.1
2
10. Rule 23 permits a class action if the plaintiffs/parties satisfy the prerequi-
sites of the rule's subdivisions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
11. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
12. 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997).
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II. WEARING THE APPROPRIATE HAT: COURT-SPONSORED VS.
PRIVATE MEDIATION
Initially, it is important to distinguish between mediation as-
signments initiated by the court and those which result from purely
private decisions mutually arrived at by mass tort adversaries. It is of
fundamental importance whether a court has requested me to at-
tempt to facilitate a resolution of pending litigation-the Agent Or-
ange, asbestos, and DES experiences-or whether the parties have
agreed to mediation with or without the approval, or even the knowl-
edge of the court-the situation in polybutylene pipe. Also, if it is
true that creative negotiation and settlement discussion is a form of
alternative dispute resolution-this is the separate role I played in
the heart valve, tobacco, and breast implant cases-then a particular
company may retain me to act as settlement counsel or consultant in
trying to secure some degree of national resolution of the contro-
versy.
The roles I play help define the nature of the process. In a court-
sponsored mediation, such as that for Agent Orange, the mediator
acts as a type of quasi-judicial official and enjoys the benefit of im-
portant leverage associated with such court sponsorship. The parties
participate knowing that the entire process has the imprimatur and
encouragement of the court. This has advantages and disadvantages.
On the plus side, court sponsorship instills in the parties the knowl-
edge that a settlement is sought and cooperation expected." A real
concern in such cases is that advocates not incur the unhappiness of
the court in working diligently towards a settlement. As a court-
designated mediator, I also enjoy additional leverage in suggesting
that certain terms and conditions will meet with court approval. On
the negative side, parties who are compelled to mediate, despite, per-
haps, a desire not to do so are more reluctant to make concessions or
offer flexible alternative terms and conditions. They often hide be-
hind the argument that they are engaged in settlement negotiations
with the mediator only because of court directive. They warn that
they are under no illusion that a settlement is likely and repeat the
admonition that they are mediating only because ordered to do so by
the court.
A privately agreed-upon mediation is marginally better and
more likely to succeed than one involving the court. In a private
13. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS ToxIc
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 12 (1986).
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mediation entered into willingly by the parties themselves, the liti-
gants have a stake in the venture-a desire to achieve success. Such a
process usually leads to a more satisfactory-if not quicker-
consensus than in those situations where the mediation is mandated
by a court.
It is important, however, not to overemphasize these concerns.
The real challenge is to get the competing adversaries to the negotia-
tion table. Whether accomplished by court directive or through pri-
vate agreement, the fact that a formalized settlement process is initi-
ated increases the likelihood of success.
III. LABORING IN THE VINEYARD: THE MOST SERIOUS OBSTACLES
TO MASS TORT RESOLUTION
Each mass tort is different---different products, different allega-
tions of culpability, differing claims of injury arising out of, thorny
disagreements over problems of medical causation and varying claims
of damage. The quantity and quality of the claims will vary from case
to case. Mass tort litigation and attempts at comprehensive resolu-
tion pose a series of recurring problems which more often than not
appear as major obstacles thwarting settlement. During the past fif-
teen years, despite the unique characteristics of each mass tort, a pat-
tern has developed concerning a number of issues which stand out
time and time again as major obstacles confronting the court, the ad-
versaries, the litigants, and neutral parties attempting to facilitate a
comprehensive settlement.
A. Aggregation
All mass torts, by definition, involve hundreds, thousands, or
even millions of individual claims located throughout the nation and,
occasionally, the world. No problem looms larger in the trial or
resolution of such litigation than the inability on grounds of efficiency
and practicality to aggregate all such claims in one forum. Indeed,
perhaps the most obvious and pointed debate over the past two dec-
ades concerns this issue of aggregation.'4 Is there a procedural
mechanism that can be used effectively to aggregate individual mass
tort claims in one court to promote ease of trial, certainty of
14. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. at 2231; Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D.
Ohio 1992); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
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settlement, and consistency in the treatment of various claimants?
This issue has bedeviled the courts since the Agent Orange case.
At various times, and in various courtrooms, the courts have looked
favorably on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the
best device to accomplish the goal of aggregation. 5 The courts in
such cases as Agent Orange, heart valves, and breast implants, ap-
plied the class action provisions of Rule 23 creatively and effectively
in order to aggregate the claims. The result created consensual set-
tlement classes resolving the mass tort litigation in its entirety. 6
More recently, other courts, in cases such as In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc.,7 the Castano v. American Tobacco Company'8 class ac-
tion, and finally, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Amchem
Products, Inc. v Windsor,'9 have criticized liberal use of Rule 23 as a
device to promote global resolution. Today, this favorite device for
promoting aggregation and rdsolution is under fire and very much
open t6 doubt.
This is unfortunate. Without some vehicle or mechanism for
consolidating all mass tort litigation in one court, any attempt at
comprehensive resolution is seriously undermined. Indeed, in my
experience, without effective aggregation there can be no truly com-
prehensive settlement. Defendant corporations, confronting present
and future litigation in various state and federal jurisdictions, often
see Rule 23 as the most effective vehicle for securing total peace.
Without it, regional or state-by-state settlements are viewed as Band-
Aids, often providing fuel for continued litigation in other jurisdic-
tions. Why throw good money at a settlement in one jurisdiction only
to confront additional litigation in another? Indeed, without the
availability of Rule 23, settlement in one jurisdiction often simply
clears the docket of pending cases, thereby permitting additional new
filings. Most importantly, the inability to make creative use of Rule
23 leaves open the serious problem of latent future claims. Without a
procedural device to terminate or at least contain future litigation
15. See Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1),
96 HARV. L. REv. 1143, 1153 n.41 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Im-
plant Prods. Liab. Litig.) No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 114580, at *1 (N.D. Ala.
Apr. 1, 1994); Bowling, 143 F.R.D. at 157-60; Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co. (In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1461 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
rev'd, 818 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987).
17. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
18. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
19. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
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based upon latent injury, the defendants in mass tort litigation often
see very little value in the resolution of current litigation.
The inability to aggregate using Rule 23 and the ineffectiveness
of alternative mechanisms in resolving all present and future mass
tort litigation, has led some defendants to look to federal bankruptcy
law as the only alternative for global resolution and financial cer-
tainty.?
Nor is it particularly realistic to expect Congress to intervene to
solve the problem. Judicial critics of Rule 23 as a device to resolve
mass tort litigation have failed to learn from history. The likelihood
of Congress acting to resolve the problem of aggregation outside of
Rule 23 by providing special legislation to end asbestos or breast im-
plant litigation is exceedingly small. Congress has never exhibited
any particular interest in getting involved in what has historically
been viewed as a tort problem for individual states to resolve.2'
As a front line observer, I am troubled by the failure of judicial
critics of Rule 23-including the Supreme Court-to appreciate fully
the importance of aggregation and Rule 23 in resolving mass tort liti-
gation.' I am a firm believer that whatever criticisms can be levelled
at the use of Rule 23-and there are many---can be addressed by the
diligent, sure, and certain power of district court oversight. A hands-
on federal judge making effective use of Rule 23 subclasses and ever
vigilant to the ethical problems of conflict of interest and dual alle-
giances, can assure that due process considerations are not ignored.
The alternatives-distorted, inefficient, and ideological battles in the
bankruptcy court or piecemeal settlements in various regions of the
nation which do not provide total peace and promote inconsistency
of awards and accompanying unhappiness and mistrust among liti-
gants-have proven to be unsatisfactory.
B. Determining the Value of Mass Tort Claims
A second problem confronting the parties and the court in mass
tort litigation concerns placing a monetary value on the claims at issue.
20. See In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-20512, 1995 WL 495978 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 1995); In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1988); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
21. See generally Amchen, 117 S. Ct. 2231. The tobacco debate is different
and unique. The pervasive use of tobacco, its health implications resulting in a
well defined federal regulatory history, and its impact on the economy all help to
place the subject on a separate plane when it comes to the increasing likelihood
of congressional action.
22. See id. at 2248-50.
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If the parties are to resolve their mass tort litigation, they need to
know what their claims are worth in order to negotiate settlement
dollars. But the massive number of claims, the often immature na-
ture of the litigation, and the ever-present problem of latent future
claims all pose serious obstacles to securing global resolution.
First, there is the problem concerning the number of claimants.
In any mass tort litigation, the claimant population is extremely di-
verse and varied. Some claimants experience very serious injuries,
while others allege moderate physical and/or mental impairment.
Many of the remaining plaintiffs exhibit only minor or nonexistent
injuries. Determining how many claimants fall into various catego-
ries of disability and death is a major problem in mass tort litigation.
As a practical matter, the defendant company is unwilling-or unable
without adequate insurance-to negotiate a huge lump-sum aggre-
gate payment designed to encompass all mass tort claimants. The ag-
gregate is simply too great and presumes the validity of each and
every claim.2 On the other hand, any attempt to resolve mass tort
litigation on a traditional case-by-case basis leads to unacceptable
overhead costs associated with individual medical evaluations and ac-
companying document corroboration. As a result, a formula is usu-
ally negotiated, providing a major discount based upon the number of
less serious claims. The problem, of course, is the inability of the
parties to agree-or even know-how many claimants fall into each
category of injury.
Second, there is the problem of litigation immaturity. Very of-
ten, mass tort litigation negotiations commence well before a histori-
cal track record is developed concerning the quality and value of the
claims. The defendant companies, determined to avoid a "bet the
company" class action litigation or consolidated trial, agree to nego-
tiate a global settlement. But neither party to the litigation has any
real indication, based on courtroom experience, of the true value of
the claims. As a result all parties, including the court and the media-
tor, are negotiating in the dark, with expectation rather than hard
evidence determining the different negotiating postures. This prob-
lem did not arise in litigation involving asbestos or DES, where there
23. No article describing my personal experiences in dealing with mass tort
litigation can ignore the ever present problem of insurance coverage. It is often
the most serious obstacle to settlement, since, without insurance proceeds, the
defendant policyholder may not be. able to pay for the settlement. See, e.g.,
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047-52 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
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was a long historical track record of financial value;24 nor was the
problem particularly acute in cases such as Agent Orange, where the
court warned the claimants that their individual claims were largely
without merit.2' But in cases such as heart valves and breast implants,
it is extremely difficult to place a value on the claims-particularly
when the product's history evidences little or no problem with its use.
The solution in such cases lies in the negotiation of a fair price, in
which both sides-negotiating at arms length-agree upon the set-
tlement value of the case. This takes into account the litigation track
record-as bare as it may be-as well as other elements of settle-
ment: litigation uncertainty; transaction costs; adverse publicity; and.
other business considerations. These variables are not as concrete or
certain as extensive verdict and settlement history, but everything is
relative in the world of mass torts. Third, there is the huge problem
of latent future claims associated with so much toxic tort litigation.
The court and the parties simply do not know how many claims will
manifest themselves in the future. In addition, there is little or no
certainty as to the quality of such claims if and when they arise.
As a result, any current negotiation designed to bring an end to
the litigation must deal with the uncertainties and question marks as-
sociated with latent future claims. It is not simply a question of un-
certain numbers. The longer the latent time period between expo-
sure to the allegedly harmful product and the manifestation of injury,
the more likely the presence of intervening or multiple medical cau-
sation. Attempting to secure a comprehensive settlement today,
which will also bind all future claimants as they arise, not only raises
important legal questions, but also poses serious practical problems
to the litigants, the court, and the mediator.'
In my experience there are three answers to the dilemma. First,
in mass tort litigation involving a relatively finite number of claims-
where the number of claims, the nature of the defective product, and
a relatively short latency period permit the parties to determine the
maximum period of future manifestation-parties can negotiate an
aggregate sum to cover all present and future claims. This is the so-
lution in cases like Dalkon Shield and heart valves; the biological
24. See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1990).
25. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 753
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
26. See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. 2113,
2122 (1997).
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clock is ticking when it comes to the potential claimant population.
Second, aggregate sums can be paid in installments, with certain
payments held back pending the quantity and quality of future mani-
fested claims. The actual amount received by any claimant will de-
pend upon the number of future claimants, along with that claimant's
confirmed injury. This is basically what Judge Weinstein did in Agent
Orange and the Manville Trust bankruptcy reorganization.2 Third, a
procedural mechanism created in the current settlement can allow fu-
ture claimants to opt out of the settlement as their illness manifests
itself or when the settlement dollars anticipated at the time of the
original settlement have diminished because of the number of subse-
quent claims. Under this approach, a future claimant is not bound to
accept the settlement amounts offered. Rather, the claimant may use
an alternative forum if the settlement dollars at the time of his or her
future claim are deemed inadequate. This was the approach taken in
the heart valve, Dalkon Shield, and breast implant settlements. The
problem with this latter alternative, of course, is the danger that the
defendant company will not achieve total peace at the time of the
settlement; there is always the specter of a flood of opt-out future
claims.2 This concern-although more apparent than real since most
claimants are risk averse-can be an obstacle to achieving a current
settlement.
C. Claims Administration
Little public attention is paid to the problem of claims admini-
stration in mass tort settlements. Once a settlement is achieved in
principle-the aggregate dollars are agreed upon and a creative for-
mula is put in place for the processing of individual claims-both the
press and public seem to lose interest. Claims administration has,
however, proven to be a major obstacle to effective implementation
of otherwise very creative settlements. The very same variables that
pose such a problem in the litigation and settlement of mass torts-
the huge number of claims, the immaturity of the litigation, the costs
associated with evaluating each and every claim, and the issue of
27. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 670-77
(E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 595 F. Supp. 740,
858-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 818 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987).
28. See In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-20512, 1995 WL 495978 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 1995); Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 114580 (N.D.
Ala. Apr. 1, 1994).
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latent disease-also can thwart well-intentioned efforts to process
claims. Additionally, in cases lacking aggregation, how does one deal
with future claims as they arise without returning to the negotiation
table?
One objective is to eliminate the less serious or the fraudulent
individual claims. This can be done in a number of ways, ranging
from a small payment to those claimants possessing weak or nonex-
istent claims of injury-the Dalkon Shield29, heart valve ° and, most
recently, breast implant3' experiences-to requiring extensive medi-
cal corroboration for those claimants seeking substantial payments. 2
In addition, various procedural devices can be put in place permitting
dissatisfied claimants to challenge the amount of their award as was
implemented in the Agent Orange,33 Dalkon Shield, 3' and heart valve
35cases
In cases involving the absence of aggregation, courts have estab-
lished some creative mechanisms to avoid reactivating formal nego-
tiation as future claims manifest themselves. In particular, in both
the asbestos and DES litigation, a series of creative future deals were
negotiated, whereby future claims would be administratively proc-
essed pursuant to an agreed upon current settlement formula. Of
course, no lawyer negotiating the current agreement can ethically
guarantee that a future claimant will be bound by the formula. As a
practical matter, though, few future claimants who manifest disease
reject the immediate payment schedule. Again, in my experience,
claimants who have the opportunity for an immediate payment
accept the money; these claimants prove to be risk averse. Such ad-
ministrative arrangements-designed to bring an end to both present
and future litigation-work effectively in promoting the same com-
prehensive result as a Rule 23 class action settlement.
29. See Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm
Lost (or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 617, 633 (1992) (explaining that the
Dalkon Shield trustees adopted a simple procedure to offer a small settlement in
return for a signed release by the claimant for future claims).
30. See generally Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
(establishing a fractured compensation program for settlements).
31. See generally In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 1994 WL 114580 at *1
(noting that certain stipulations excluded some breast implant recipients from
the class).
32. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 86 F.3d 364,369 (4th Cir. 1996).
33. See Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.),
611 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 818 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987).
34. See In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1989).
35. See Bowling, 143 F.R.D. at 141.
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D. Ethics
Judge Weinstein has written extensively in recent years about
the ethical problems associated with mass tort litigation and settle-
ments." Lack of communication between lawyers and their clients,
conflict of interest, divided loyalties, and problems of attorneys' fees
have all been well documented in both the literature and court deci-
sions.37 One problem, however, recurs in the course of my efforts to
settle mass tort litigation-in an aggregate settlement involving a
fixed amount to be distributed to hundreds or even thousands of
claimants-how does the plaintiff lawyer representing so many
claimants decide how much of the aggregate each receives? It is not
practical for the lawyer to communicate with each and every one of
his clients, informing each of them how much they will receive rela-
tive to others similarly situated. Occasionally, the problem does not
arise; the aggregate amount is determined through a negotiation
where every claim is evaluated, leading to a computed aggregate
amount-the so-called "bottom up" determination. Each claimant
can either accept or reject a specific amount earmarked during the
course of the negotiations. But in a "top down" deal, in which the ag-
gregate is negotiated without regard to how much each individual
claimant will receive pending some type of claims evaluation process,
serious conflict of interest issues arise. How does the lawyer repre-
senting multiple claimants decide how much each receives?
Enter the mediator. As an independent, detached, and objective
observer, the mediator may often be asked by the lawyer-and the
court-to determine a fair allocation formula, which will be pre-
sented to the lawyer's clients. Each client will have an opportunity to
accept or reject the allocated amount. Although, in theory, any indi-
vidual claimant can reject the award or demand an additional portion
of the aggregate settlement amount, in practice such rejection is very
rare. It is the mediator rather than the lawyer who determines how
to allocate the aggregate, based upon a well-publicized, principled
allocation formula tied to such variables as seriousness of illness or
degree of disability.38 Interposing a neutral third party into the
36. See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION (1995).
37. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange", 611 F. Supp. at 1453-55.
38. The development of such eligibility criteria may prove extremely prob-
lematic, at least in those cases where traditional tort concepts governing evidence
of causation and relative degree of damage are absent. Compare the asbestos,
Dalkon Shield, and heart valves cases where causation evidence was available to
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allocation mix goes a long way toward resolving a serious ethical di-
lemma.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have not attempted in this brief Essay to analyze at length all of
my experiences as a mediator in mass tort litigation and settlements.
I aimed to provide an overview of some of the practical problems
which arise in attempting to resolve such litigation and the pragmatic
solutions offered to deal with these problems. What should be em-
phasized is the importance placed by the mediator on the coopera-
tion of the court and, even more importantly, the parties. Once ne-
gotiations begin, once the parties come to the negotiation table with
the understanding that an attempt will be made to resolve the con-
troversy, I find that it is more than likely that resolution will be
achieved. The problem is getting the parties to the table! The most
serious obstacle to the resolution of mass tort litigation is the reluc-
tance of the litigants to negotiate or even attempt to do so. 9 For
every mass tort in which the court or the parties seek the assistance
of a neutral party to structure and guide the negotiations, there are
many more where a litigation war of wills is the preferred course of
action. This is both unfortunate and frustrating. Negotiation can de-
velop very creative, cost-effective settlement terms and conditions if
the parties-both the lawyers and their principals-will see the wis-
dom and pragmatic value of working out their differences.
This is my greatest challenge-getting the parties to opt into the
mediation process. Once they do so, success is usually certain.
0
the Agent Orange and breast implant cases where causation evidence was dubi-
ous and uncertain.
39. In my experience, plaintiffs' counsel representing allegedly injured claim-
ants are always prepared to engage in nonbinding alternative dispute resolution,
such as mediation. It is the defendant companies, fearing extortionate demands
and a proliferation of claims if any sign of weakness is demonstrated, that usually
balk at such settlement initiatives. This poses an interesting strategic dilemma
for such companies: at exactly what point in the litigation process do settlement
discussions make strategic and tactical sense-a discussion reserved for another
mass torts symposium.
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